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Abstract
Since the recent rejuvenation of intuition research within the management literature, significant work has 
been done on conceptualizing intuition. Whilst remarkable progress has been achieved in many areas of 
intuition, the role of intuition in creativity remains comparatively under-researched. Through an extensive 
review of intuition literature, we believe that a reason for this could be that intuition in the management 
literature is generally conceptualized as judgement. In this article we aim to extend our understanding of 
intuition in creativity by distinguishing between intuitive judgment and intuitive insight. Strengthening our 
case, this article builds on two previous research projects. The first focuses on literature-based features 
of intuition and the second project builds a conceptual model of knowledge types. Further informing the 
argument is Polanyi’s distinction of focal and subsidiary awareness. These considerations lead us to propose 
that there are two distinct kinds of intuition – intuitive judgement and intuitive insight.
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Introduction
The main contribution of this article is introducing the distinction between intuitive insight 
and intuitive judgement. The significance of distinguishing between these two concepts is that it 
provides us with a better understanding of the role of intuition in creativity, which is the least 
understood and researched area of intuition in management research. Therefore, our findings help 
elucidate a better understanding of creativity and thus extend our knowledge of intuition. Moreover, 
this is potentially valuable to knowledge-oriented organizations (Argyris and Schön, 1978; 
Davenport and Prusak, 2000) who place considerable emphasis on creativity, not only in the area 
of R&D, but also in a wide variety of business functions.
In order to fully understand the rationale behind the argument presented in this article, relevant 
literature substantiating the development of our argument is examined and several conceptual 
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models briefly discussed. In particular the article explores the literature beyond management 
research to gather evidence about the use of intuition in creativity, and also ventures into Polanyi’s 
philosophy and Jung’s psychology, amongst others, for helpful supplementary models.
Hodgkinson et al. (2008: 1) suggest that ‘intuition lies at the heart of a number of dual-process 
theories of cognition’. These dual-process theories came about since cognition appeared to be dif-
ficult to understand as a unitary construct (e.g. Evans, 2010). There are many variants of the dual-
process theories, each with slightly different versions of duality. The roots of this duality can be 
traced back to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in the western world; the first well-known one from the 
modern era is Freud’s (1900) distinction of primary and secondary mental operations. Neisser 
(1963) gives an overview of this early period, to finally propose the dualism of sequential vs. mul-
tiple processing. Some more recent dualist conceptions include the extensional vs. intuitive reason-
ing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), controlled vs. intuitive mode of cognitive function and 
reasoning vs. intuition (Kahneman, 2003), rational vs. experiential, which is later referred to as 
analytical-rational vs. intuitive-experiential (Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1996) and System 1 vs. 
System 2 (Frankish, 2010; Stanovich and West, 1998, 2000). Without trying to list all the different 
versions of the dual-process theories (a review of models can be found in Evans, 2008) we indicate 
that they always distinguish between a process that comes close to intuiting and another which we 
can best describe as non-intuitive.1 Regardless of which version of the dual-process theories one 
accepts, the duality of intuitive and non-intuitive processing seems to have been widely recog-
nized. For example, Barnard (1938: 291) recognized the importance of this duality for manage-
ment and argued that, apart from good logical analysis, intuition is ‘nowhere more indispensable 
than in executive arts’.
Research on intuition became increasingly popular in the last two decades in the manage-
ment literature and in the academic world more generally (e.g. Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012; 
Osbeck, 1999, 2001). We see two reasons for this: (1) intuition is the perhaps least understood 
aspect of managerial cognition (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011) and (2) without understanding 
intuition it is impossible to develop any meaningful conceptualization of cognition. For instance 
Chalmers (1998: 110) argues that intuition is ‘the very raison d’être’ of the problem of cogni-
tion. Thus the only consistent way of avoiding the problem of intuition would be to deny it 
completely; which would, in turn, mean denying the problem and the phenomenon of con-
sciousness itself. Examining the conceptualization of knowledge, Polanyi (1969: 106) com-
pares intuition to a sleeping monster, which, once awakened, may destroy our view of knowledge 
altogether. However, we believe that if it is destructive trying to understand intuition then 
destruction is needed, as our view of knowledge and consciousness cannot be meaningful 
unless it accounts for intuition as well.
In this article we propose a provisional distinction of two types of intuition which we 
call intuitive judgement and intuitive insight. This distinction helps us in developing a better 
understanding of creative intuition, which is perhaps the least understood of the various types 
of intuition (e.g. Dane and Pratt, 2009; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011; Sinclair, 2010). We 
believe that offering this conceptualization contributes towards the overall goal of improving 
our understanding of intuition more generally.
This article builds on two previous research projects in which we were trying to establish 
intuition as a valid form of knowledge. In the first case (Dörfler et al., 2010a) we examined the 
nature of personal knowledge to identify different knowledge types. We started from Ryle’s 
(1949) distinction of ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’, to which we added three further types, 
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‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘it’. We concluded that both the ‘know why’ and the ‘know what’ belong to 
intuition. In the second case we surveyed the literature and identified a set of six features which 
define intuitive knowledge. (Dörfler and Ackermann, 2011) These six features of intuition 
resemble closely those of others (cf. Kahneman, 2003: 698; Sadler-Smith, 2008: 13). Three of 
these apply to the process of intuiting and three to the outcome of such a process, the intuitive 
knowledge. Intuiting is rapid (often labelled instantaneous), spontaneous (does not require 
effort and cannot be deliberately controlled) and alogical (meaning that it does not necessarily 
contradict the rules of logic but does not follow them either). The outcome of the intuitive pro-
cess is tacit (in that the intuitives cannot give account of how they arrived at the results), holistic 
(also often called gestalt, as it is concerned with the totality of a situation rather than parts of it), 
and the intuitor feels confident about their intuition (with no apparent reason in terms of 
evidence). Alongside this process of searching for the features of intuition, we have recognized 
that all the reports, whether academic or practitioner, from a variety of fields, including manage-
ment, psychology and philosophy as well as reports from artists and scientists from diverse 
fields, mention two major areas in which intuition is used: namely decision taking and creative 
problem solving.
Based on the above, we challenge one of the underlying assumptions of the vast majority of 
intuition research in the field of management: namely that all intuition is judgement. As many 
of the management scholars interested in intuition are coming from the discipline of decision 
making/taking, this assumption appears to be taken for granted, so much so that it is usually 
not explicitly stated. However, we believe that this implicit presumption limits our understand-
ing of intuition, which is particularly salient in the case of creative intuition. As we will show, 
distinguishing between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight does not contradict any of the 
findings arrived at when considering intuition-as-judgement, rather it adds an extra dimension 
to the previously suggested typologies and thus offers a richer picture of intuition. It also does 
not directly contradict the distinction between intuition and insight as two related but distinct 
constructs (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hogarth, 2001). Instead it refines 
the distinction: namely there is intuitive and non-intuitive insight, just as there is intuitive and 
non-intuitive judgement.
As we will argue, we are not introducing a superfluous concept in an area which is already rid-
dled with models and constructs. Instead we believe that based on previous research the distinc-
tion between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight can help us achieve a more nuanced and 
comprehensive picture of intuition. Although we agree with Isaack (1978: 919) that ‘intellect 
cannot completely understand the intuition since the artificial tools, preconceived categories, and 
symbols used by the intellect only represent reality and are not the substance of reality’, we believe 
that it is important to try from an ‘intuitive understanding of intuition’ to extract and logically 
develop concepts that can be debated.
In the next section of this article we establish intuition as a form of knowledge, emphasizing 
that in this research we are only interested in intuition as it operates at high levels of expertise. 
This helps build the argument by providing scope and focus. Then we attempt to describe the 
process of intuiting; for this we need to first briefly revisit the concepts of focal and subsidiary 
awareness introduced by Polanyi. Finally, we introduce our idea of distinguishing between 
intuitive judgement and intuitive insight, offering it for debate as an additional viewpoint in the 
ongoing development of the conceptual framework for intuition research. As part of this discus-
sion, we illustrate how they can be integrated into the existing typologies as a new dimension.
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Intuition as expert knowledge
Inspiration comes only to the prepared mind. Pasteur (quoted by Simon, 1983: 27)
In terms of knowing, we can use our knowledge to understand something through analytical step-
by-step reasoning, e.g. comparing and contrasting alternatives, evaluating them, examining their 
characteristics, the associated costs and benefits, etc. However, such step-by-step reasoning is not 
the only way of knowing. Intuitive knowledge is often described by scientists (see e.g. Beveridge, 
1957; Hadamard, 1954; Koestler, 1971) and decision takers2 (see e.g. Barnard, 1938; Campbell 
and Mintzberg, 1991; Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004; Simon, 1987). They just ‘know’, in a moment 
without knowing how or why they ‘know’. Thus the knowledge arrived at by means of intuiting we 
call intuitive knowledge. Based on an examination of a wide range of literature (for example social 
and cognitive psychology, history and philosophy of science, education), in this section we argue 
for the validity of intuitive knowledge. Conceptualizing intuition as intuitive knowledge, although 
limiting the scope of the intuition field, enables us to apply arguments originally developed for 
the domain of knowledge to the domain of intuition. We also argue that intuition worthy of trust 
(cf. Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Salas et al., 2010) appears to be experienced by 
experts and thus we limit our research to expert intuition. These limitations help us make our argu-
ment for the two types of intuition tighter.
Intuitive knowledge
In spite of the large number of reports and studies in favour of intuition, it was not fully explored 
systematically in the mainstream academic literature until recently (e.g. Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 
2012; Dane and Pratt, 2007, 2009; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 2008, 2009b; 
Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). The reason is probably, as Tsoukas (2005a: 142) says, that we pre-
fer explicit knowledge obtained through well-defined, if possible standardized, procedures and 
conversely we mistrust intuitive knowledge obtained through ad hoc or, at least, less-defined prac-
tices. However this perception has changed and more researchers are now recognizing that the 
deliberative conscious reasoning is not the only way of arriving at valid knowledge. (Hodgkinson 
et al., 2009a: 279)
Of course, this does not mean that scientists have not used their intuition before, only 
typically they pretended that new knowledge has always been arrived at by the established 
‘scientific method’ of the time (e.g. Schrödinger, 1958). Nevertheless, for decades there have 
been philosophers and scientists-turned-philosophers, fighting to establish intuition as a valid 
form of knowledge. For instance Bruner (1966: 2), after building up his reputation in the 
accepted mainstream psychology, argued for the important role of intuition, particularly in con-
sidering the most significant scientific achievements: ‘Reaching for knowledge with the right 
hand is science. Yet to say only that much of science is to overlook one of its excitements, for 
the great hypotheses of science are gifts carried in the left hand’. Furthermore, he emphasizes 
(Bruner, 1977: 67) that it is usually the most esteemed scientists who earn the label ‘intuitive’, 
which in itself is strong evidence that scientists find intuition valuable.
Spinoza (1677: Part 2, Proposition 40, Scholium 42) distinguished three kinds of knowledge: 
(1) opinion or imagination, (2) reason and (3) intuitive knowledge; and without much explanation 
declared that intuitive knowledge is the most powerful of the three (Spinoza, 1677: Part 5, Proposition 
36, Scholium). Jung (1921: §770) distinguished four psychological functions: thinking, feeling, sen-
sation and intuition. He was probably the first to emphasize the intrinsic certainty and self-referential 
nature of intuitive knowledge. Bergson (1946) similarly argued that intuition is a superior form of 
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knowledge; furthermore arguing that no complex thought can be arrived at other than by means of 
intuiting. He sees the role of intuition (Bergson, 1911: 238, 239) as helping to arrive at new ideas, 
after which we should abandon intuition and work on building the body of knowledge using the new 
intuitively obtained knowledge. Once we start feeling lost, we should get in touch with our intuition 
again (often undoing what we have done in the deliberative phase) and so forth in cycles. Therefore 
Bergson (1946: 33 ff.) argues for intuition as a method, particularly in metaphysics and in areas of 
complex, dynamic and abstract thinking, contrasting intuition to intellect.
It must be noted that identifying intuition with intuitive knowledge is a limitation. We do not 
intend neglecting intuition outside the area of knowledge; however this constraint helps provide a 
focus for this article. Moreover it must be acknowledged that intuition also appears in other facul-
ties, such as feelings and emotions. Gerard (cited by Vaughan, 1979: 66–80) distinguishes four 
levels of intuitive awareness: the physical, the emotional, the mental and the spiritual. Extending 
the examination of intuition to the other three faculties can foster a deeper understanding of intui-
tion as well as explain the somatic and affective charges often reported about intuition. Elsewhere 
(Dörfler and Szendrey, 2008) we have focused on this multi-potential aspect of intuition and more 
generally of cognition.
Intuition at high levels of expertise
When reviewing the literature on intuition, we initially believed that there is an additional feature, 
namely that intuition only appears where high levels of expertise exist. Some authors, for example, 
Crossan et al. (1999) and Miller and Ireland (2005) consider expert intuition as particular type of 
intuition. We briefly analyse these two considerations in order to illustrate why we view expertise 
as something that characterizes valuable intuition rather than being a type of intuition in its own 
right, and based on this examination limit our focus to intuition of experts.
Crossan et al. (1999: 526) distinguish between expert intuition and entrepreneurial intuition. 
They argue that the former is past pattern oriented; thus the experts ‘almost spontaneously’ apply 
their existing knowledge in a familiar or similar to familiar situation. On the contrary, the latter is 
supposedly future- and change-oriented, thus the ability to make novel connections and discern 
possibilities. The problem with this distinction is that the proposed two kinds of intuition reside in 
different dimensions. We can have different levels of expertise and we can be entrepreneurial to 
varying degrees. A possible relationship is that one needs certain minimal level of expertise to be 
entrepreneurial in any field and that higher level of knowledge means better entrepreneurship.
Miller and Ireland (2005: 21) distinguish between ‘holistic hunch’ and ‘automated expertise’. 
The first ‘corresponds to judgement or choice made through a subconscious synthesis of infor-
mation drawn from diverse experiences’, whilst the second is ‘merely’ subconscious application 
of learned rules. Of course, for the holistic hunch to be able to synthesize information from 
diverse experiences, that information needs to be there. So, again, this simple distinction cannot 
be maintained. It is also a well-known phenomenon that experts will not only be able to handle 
situations they have already experienced or for what they have learned rules (e.g. Sadler-Smith, 
2008: 257) but will also be able to go beyond the existing knowledge.
Whilst many researchers consider intuition useful, other scholars argue fiercely against it. If we 
examine arguments from the latter, that is those who have provided experimental evidence on the 
failure of intuition (such as Bowers et al., 1990: 97; Schoemaker and Russo, 1993: 27; Trailer and 
Morgan, 2004), we will see that many of them have examined novices’ intuitions. For instance, 
Trailer and Morgan (2004) observed that undergraduate students of business administration make 
poor intuitive judgements in the field of physics. In contrast, those who have found intuition useful 
in their respective fields of research (such as Keren, 1987: in the game of bridge; Burke and Miller, 
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1999: in management; Hayashi, 2001: in leadership), typically focused on expert intuition. 
As empirical (and particularly the experimental) evidence in the area of intuition in management is 
relatively scarce, the previous argument is not conclusive but the findings appear to illustrate that 
expertise contributes to effective intuition (Salas et al., 2010).
What certainly appears to be the case is that intuition, at least good intuition, appears where 
there is high level of expertise (see e.g. Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Prietula and Simon, 1989). 
This, however, does not help in distinguishing intuition from non-intuition. Even though one can 
learn certain analytical steps and apply them at a low level of expertise, higher level of expertise 
certainly entails both better intuition and better analysis. But there is something important about 
the relationship between intuition and the level of expertise. To approach the relationship between 
intuition and expertise from a different angle, it is possible to start from the research on levels of 
knowledge. There are three distinct streams of research on knowledge levels with very different 
approaches. Simon with various colleagues (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973; Simon, 1996) and 
Ericsson (e.g. Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson et al., 1993) used primarily experimental approaches, 
supplemented with verbal reports. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (e.g. Benner, 2004; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 
1986, 2005) adopted phenomenological observations in various natural contexts. Dörfler et al. 
(2009) applied conceptual modelling based on a geometrical analogy and gestalt-like examina-
tion of well-known phenomena. All these researchers argue that when one achieves a high level 
of expertise, intuition naturally emerges and at the highest level it becomes the dominant form of 
knowledge (for a more detailed overview see Gobet and Chassy, 2009). Therefore we agree with 
Dane and Pratt (2009: 5, 6) that expertise is an antecedent to trustworthy intuition and hence we 
are only interested in intuition in those with a high level of expertise, what Sadler-Smith and 
Shefy (2004) call ‘intuition-as-expertise’, Kahneman and Klein (2009) call ‘intuitive expertise’ 
and Salas et al. (2010) call ‘expertise-based intuition’.
Having established intuitive knowledge as a valid form of knowledge in the first part of this 
section, in the second part we limit the scope and narrow the focus: namely focusing on intuition 
as knowledge (and intuiting as knowing respectively) where considerable expertise is held, and we 
are trying to argue for distinguishing between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight as two 
meaningful forms of intuitive knowledge. To make this argument possible we need to look more 
closely at intuition at work, namely how the process of intuiting is structured.
The process of intuiting
According to Lieberman (2000: 109) intuition is at best regarded as mysterious and unexplainable. 
Seligman and Kahana (2009: 399) suggest that this might be because we do not understand its 
‘cognitive architecture’. Hammond (2010: 329) further argues that we should first become familiar 
with this mysterious process of intuition and therefore in this section we aim to shed some light on 
what lies behind the mystery – particularly as it will help develop our argument for the two forms 
of intuition. In order to describe the process of intuiting we first need to briefly revisit Polanyi’s 
model of focal and subsidiary knowing, which is based on his conception of tacit knowing (Polanyi, 
1966b; Tsoukas, 2005b). Polanyi (1966a) argues that all tacit knowing can be explained on the 
basis of focal and subsidiary components and that, in turn, all knowing is, at least partly, tacit.
Focal and subsidiary
Whilst examining the act of knowing Polanyi (1962a: 55–65) realized that, for example, when 
hammering in a nail, we are differently aware of the hammer and of the nail. What is the focus 
of our act, he called ‘focal awareness’ (driving in the nail); which is supported by ‘subsidiary 
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awareness’ of everything else (feeling in our palm, hammer, etc.). Polanyi (1966b: 7–19) used 
these two kinds of awareness to explain the act of tacit knowing. To help in conceptualizing the 
process of intuiting, we will briefly review Polanyi’s model of the two kinds of awareness and 
the related concepts of focal and subsidiary and knowing, (following Polanyi’s argument); to 
these we add the description of focal and subsidiary knowledge (following Baracskai, 1997: 
107–110). The same train of thought in a wider scope can be found in Dörfler et al. (2010a). In 
the next subsection, we will apply the distinction of focal and subsidiary to intuition and intuiting 
which will help us explain the structure of intuiting.
In his original description Polanyi (1966b: 11) started by borrowing metaphors from anatomy:
we are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit knowing in the appearance of its distal term; we are 
aware of that from which we are attending to another thing, in the appearance of that thing.
For further clarification the use of these terms is illustrated through an example. If we try with 
our eyes closed to use a stick to explore a room, initially we will concentrate on the end of the stick 
in our hand, more precisely, on the feelings experienced in our fingers.3 Thus concentrating on the 
near end (proximal term) of the stick, even though we are really interested in what is at the far end 
of the stick (distal term), the room. However after a short period, we forget about the stick in our 
hand and start picturing the room’s layout. This is what is meant by attending from the proximal to 
the distal. Furthermore, Polanyi (1962a: 55–65) realized that we are differently aware of proximal 
and distal. The awareness of the distal he calls focal, as it is in the focus, and the awareness of the 
proximal he labels subsidiary. In the previous case, the room is in the focus and we have subsidiary 
awareness of the feelings in palm, vibrations, etc. Using another example, whilst writing, the 
meaning of the text is in the focus and the letters, grammatical rules, etc. are in the subsidiary 
awareness. We can see that knowing the proximal is usually tacit as ‘our subsidiary awareness of a 
thing may not suffice to make it identifiable’ (Polanyi, 1966a: 4) whilst knowing the distal is 
always explicit as ‘focal awareness is always conscious’ (Polanyi, 1962b: 602).
What is in focus requires focal attention and that kind of attention can be paid only to one thing 
at a time (Anderson, 2000; Broadbent, 1958; Cherry, 1953; Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963; Sullivan, 
1976; Treisman, 1964). This also means that the rest of the 7±2 ‘slots’ (Baddeley, 1994; Miller, 
1956) in the working memory can only belong to the subsidiary attention. This also fits the previous 
examples about exploring the room and writing: we can pay focal attention to one whole entity 
(a single distal term) and subsidiary attention to multiple particulars (i.e. several proximal terms).
The above discussion of focal and subsidiary awareness follows from the literature. However, 
to apply the same line of thinking to intuition is not straightforward. Therefore we use the more 
overarching concept of ‘knowledge’ instead of ‘intuition’ to facilitate this exploration (as we 
limited the notion of intuition to intuitive knowledge, what applies to all knowledge/knowing 
should also apply to the intuitive subset of knowledge/knowing). Although there are various con-
ceptualizations of the distinction between knowledge and knowing (see e.g. Nicolini et al., 2003; 
Polanyi, 1962a, 1969; Tsoukas, 1998, 2005a), in the case of personal knowledge (as opposed to 
organizational knowledge) all these authors agree that knowledge is mental content. Knowing is 
then seen as a process through which knowledge is used, such as learning, thinking or applying 
knowledge.
In considering again the example of writing, this time from the viewpoint of explicit and tacit 
knowledge, letters, words and rules of grammar belong to the explicit domain (i.e. these can be 
learned in the classroom). However we cannot teach in the classroom how to write a good poem 
(i.e. it belongs to the domain of tacit knowledge). As it was said previously, letters, words and the 
rules of grammar are the particulars (proximal term, subsidiary attention), whilst the poem 
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corresponds to the whole entity (distal term, focal attention). Thus, the subsidiary knowledge is 
explicit and the focal knowledge is tacit. However earlier in the article, when discussing Polanyi’s 
work, we established that in terms of knowing, the distal is characterized by explicit knowing and 
the proximal is characterized by tacit knowing. So, the tacit-explicit relation now appears to be 
reversed (see Figure 1). We have identified an interesting contrast between knowledge and know-
ing. Whilst we can explicitly identify what we are focusing on (focal knowing), we are unable to 
actually provide an explicit description of this content (focal knowledge). This corresponds to 
being able to say that we are writing a (good) poem but this does not mean that we can put into 
words what a good poem is. Moreover, we usually cannot identify the particulars of the subsidiary 
attention (subsidiary knowing). However, if someone would point these out for us, we might be 
able to provide an explicit account about the content of these particulars (subsidiary knowledge). 
We cannot say which letters and rules of grammar we use when writing the poem but, if someone 
asked about them, we could explain them explicitly. The root cause of the difference is that tacit-
explicit knowledge refers to the nature of the content; whilst the tacit-explicit knowing is about 
identifying this content.
So what we focus on can be characterized by tacit knowledge and explicit knowing, whilst 
our subsidiary awareness is characterized by explicit knowledge and tacit knowing. In the next 
subsection we apply these findings to intuition (intuitive knowledge) and intuiting (process of 
intuitive knowing) in order to understand the structure of intuiting.
The structure of intuiting
In this section we describe a characteristic which leads to an apparent contradiction between 
how Simon (1987) and Mintzberg (1994) see intuition; this contradiction, together with the 
focal-subsidiary distinction serve as the starting point for understanding the structure of intuit-
ing. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1982: 124) intuition is arrived at ‘without the use of 
analytic methods or deliberate calculation’, Vance et al. (2007) describe it as a non-linear mode 
of thinking, Barnard (1938: 301 ff.) calls it ‘non-logical’ to contrast it to the logical process of 
analytical reasoning, Rowan (1986: 84) defines it as ‘knowledge gained without rational 
thought’. Although the terminology is slightly different, in every case the message is that intuit-
ing operates independently of the general principles of reasoning that Russell (1946: 379) calls 
logic. We call this mode of operation alogical, meaning that it neither follows (logical) nor 
contradicts (illogical) the rules of logic.
Simon (1987: 61) emphasizes that intuition and analysis are not operating independent of each 
other but rather in a complementary manner. Furthermore, he states (Simon, 1987: 63) that 
Rules of grammar Good poem
Subsidiary Focal
Knowledge Explicit Tacit
Mental content
Knowing Tacit Explicit
Identifying the content
Figure 1. Knowledge and knowing when writing a poem.
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‘Intuition and judgement – at least good judgement – are simply analyses frozen into habit and 
into the capacity for rapid response through recognition’. Mintzberg (1994) challenges Simon’s 
conception, arguing that intuition is about synthesis and synthesis can never be derived from 
analyses. Considering the foundational status of these two thinkers, it seems reasonable to ask 
whether this apparent contradiction can be resolved. Simon (e.g. March and Simon, 1993; Simon, 
1983, 1992) usually explained intuition as experts recognizing patterns relevant to their experi-
ence. Kahneman (2010, personal communication) said that he was sure that Simon’s view of 
intuition includes synthesis, and this is completely consistent with the view of intuition as pattern 
recognition (e.g. Hogarth, 2010; Simon, 1987). Perhaps there is a simple answer to why Simon 
talks about ‘analyses frozen into habit’: analysis here may not mean the opposite of synthesis but 
the opposite of intuition, which seems plausible from the previous quote. This would meant that 
Simon meant ‘non-intuitions frozen into habit’ constituting intuition. Below we explore whether 
it is possible to understand how these non-intuitions may constitute intuition by applying to intui-
tion/intuiting what we have discussed about knowledge/knowing in terms of the focal-subsidiary 
distinction. Jung (1921: §772) starts from the end-product of intuiting trying to find its ingredi-
ents, and he finds that intuition can usually be decomposed into its constituents and by doing so 
the intuitor can arrive at a logical explanation of the intuitive outcome.
By combining the two descriptions (i.e. Jung and Polanyi) it is possible to gain a better under-
standing of intuition. The distal term that we pay focal attention to is the focal intuition/intuiting; 
it corresponds to the whole entity (the room we are exploring using a stick and the meaning of 
the text when writing). Based on the argument outlined in the first part of this section, we can 
expect that the focal intuition is tacit and alogical and that the focal intuiting is explicit and logi-
cal. As we can identify the outcome of intuiting, we can accept that focal intuiting is explicit and 
as its content cannot be taught in a classroom setting, the focal intuition is considered tacit. The 
proximal term of intuition, what we pay subsidiary attention to, is the subsidiary intuition/intuit-
ing. Jung’s constituents belong here; they correspond to the particulars from the first subsection 
of this section (the near-end of the stick when exploring the room or the knowledge of letters and 
grammar when writing a poem). We expect that the subsidiary intuition is logical and can be put 
into words (as it could be taught in a classroom setting) and that the subsidiary intuiting is tacit 
and alogical (as we cannot identify the particulars). Of course, we could pay attention to the 
particulars, only then we would probably lose the sight of the whole entity and focus upon a 
particular aspect; however, if we focus on the whole entity the particulars get submerged in the 
whole (Polanyi, 1961: 460).
What we have not explained so far is how the subsidiary particulars come together into the 
whole entity on which we focus (Polanyi, 1965: 802) in the process of intuiting. (Figure 2) This 
from-to process (Polanyi, 1968: 30), by which the particulars fuse into the whole entity, lasts as 
long as the person sustains it. Polanyi (1965: 800) calls this process ‘integration’ and he extends the 
concept of tacit knowing to this integrative process (Polanyi, 1962b: 602):
What is subsidiarily known is tacitly known; but it seems appropriate to extend the meaning of ‘tacit 
knowing’ to include the integration of subsidiary to focal knowing. The structure of tacit knowing is then 
the structure of this integrative process, and knowing is tacit to the extent to which it has such a structure.
For better understanding of subsidiary intuition, we need to figure out what the particulars are. 
Jung’s description helps here: these are the components of the explanation – this is why it always 
has to be obtained afterwards. There can be ‘rules’ to follow and ‘methods’ to apply – but they have 
little to do with how we arrived at the intuitive knowledge. We might have used some of the ‘rules’ 
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or ‘methods’, only they have undergone a tacit process of integration and thus we cannot identify 
them. Elsewhere (Dörfler et al., 2010b) we have used the example of jokes which are logical with 
hindsight – but only with hindsight. The ‘rules’ and ‘methods’ cannot conjure the intuitive leap but 
once we have arrived at the intuitive outcome, we may use them to explain it. Sonenshein (2007) 
arrived at a similar model in the special case of moral decisions.
Now that we have described the intuitive process in terms of the particulars going through a tacit 
process of integration we put forward our main argument that we can conceptualize two distinct 
types of intuition – these are sufficiently similar to identify both as intuition but, at the same time, 
sufficiently different to distinguish between them.
Intuition in judgement and insight
One of the insights that emerged whilst reviewing the literature on the features of intuition was 
that most if not all accounts of intuitive knowledge can be located in one of two areas: decision 
taking and creativity. We came to the same conclusion through building a conceptual model of the 
types of knowledge, as noted above. Whilst not being sufficient grounds for a conclusive infer-
ence that there are only two different kinds of intuition (cf. Dane and Pratt, 2009; Glöckner and 
Witteman, 2009; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011), this insight became the starting point of this 
inquiry. However, in order to build a more solid foundation we examined in more depth prior 
empirical and conceptual work. Whilst there are other typologies of intuition in the literature, we 
adopted a different perspective from these, enabling us to gain a different understanding and 
which we believe helps move researchers closer to conceptualizing the role of intuition in creativ-
ity. Examples of these other typologies include Dane and Pratt (2009) who distinguish problem 
solving, moral and creative intuitions; Glöckner and Witteman (2009) who differentiate associa-
tive, matching, accumulative and constructive intuitions; and Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) who 
identify problem-solving, creative, social and moral intuitions as primary types (the secondary 
types being composites of the primary types), etc. The three mentioned examples are very differ-
ent. Dane and Pratt (2009) distinguish between various types of intuition, Glöckner and Witteman’s 
(2009) model is concerned with the processes underlying intuition, while Gore and Sadler-Smith 
(2011) offer a typology of intuition types as well as a model of the processes of intuiting underly-
ing these intuitions. All these distinctions, however, appear to presume that intuition is judge-
ment. Providing substance to our exploration, Sinclair (2010: 382) suggests that the decision 
paradigm of intuition is potentially too narrow to account for a broader picture of intuition. This 
Figure 2. Focal and subsidiary intuition.
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recognition is our departure point and extending this narrow framework is what we want to 
achieve with this article. We will also show that our distinction between intuitive judgement and 
intuitive insight can be added to the existing typologies resulting in a richer picture of intuition.
Intuitive judgement
We do not intend to provide a detailed discussion here on intuition specifically focused on intuitive 
judgement, as that would mean including virtually all intuition research in the field of manage-
ment. Instead, we will explore a couple of reference points in order to extrapolate the research in 
the field into a conceptual foundation on which we can build our argument for delineating the 
concept of intuitive insight from the concept of intuitive judgement.
A large number of researchers whose work was explored in the literature review (including 
Agor, 1984, 1989; Barnard, 1938; Dane and Pratt, 2007, 2009; Dean and Mihalasky, 1974; 
Hodgkinson et al., 2009a; Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 2004; Simon, 1987; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 
2005; Sinclair et al., 2009) talk about the role intuition plays in decision taking. It is frequently 
argued that decision takers tend to rely more on their intuition when they are in senior positions, 
in situations that are messy and where time is short. This resonates well with our above argument 
on intuition and expertise.
As illustrated in the extant literature (as noted earlier), intuition has been primarily examined in 
terms of its role in decision taking (within the management literature). For example, when Barnard 
(1938: 235) describes intuition as being an important part of the executive process he talks about 
decision taking:
It transcends the capacity of merely intellectual methods, and the techniques of discriminating the factors 
of the situation. The terms pertinent to it are ‘feeling,’ ‘judgement,’ ‘sense, ‘proportion,’ ‘balance,’ 
‘appropriateness’. It is a matter of art rather than science, and is aesthetic rather than logical.
This is not surprising, as the framework for investigating intuition, in the management field, 
stems from observing decision takers – specifically that they often do not use the tools and tech-
niques taught on management courses and described in academic decision books but rather rely on 
their intuition. In these situations, decision takers use their intuition in producing a judgement. This 
implies that the role of intuition in, for example, generating decision alternatives is not of primary 
concern, although it is often noted that intuition may play role in all phases of the decision process 
(e.g. Agor, 1989). As the term intuitive judgement is often used in much of the intuition literature 
in the field of management (e.g. Dane and Pratt, 2009; Gilovich et al., 2002; Hodgkinson et al., 
2009a; Hogarth, 2001) and it is also very descriptive, we keep this term and will use it for describ-
ing the intuition of the decision taker.
Intuitive insight
[I]t is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover. (Poincaré, 1914: 129)
The other part of the reviewed (non-management) literature (e.g. Bergson, 1946; Beveridge, 1957; 
Bruner, 1966; Hadamard, 1954; Hong, 2006b; Poincaré, 1914; Popper, 1968) focuses on intuition 
in creativity. There seems to be a general agreement that intuition is a necessary component of 
creativity (see e.g. Polanyi, 1962a, 1964, 1966b); at least, the creation of any great novum 
(new knowledge) appears to be based on intuition. Based on recent research involving in-depth 
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interviews with Nobel Laureates and creative people of similar standing (Dörfler and Eden, 
2011), we are inclined to believe that no significant creative result has been achieved in any other 
way than by means of intuition. Some of the management literature also mentions and, occasion-
ally, discusses in depth the role intuition plays in creativity (e.g. Claxton, 1998; Dane and Pratt, 
2009; Hodgkinson et al., 2009a; Sinclair, 2010); however, apart from notable exceptions (Sinclair, 
2010), intuition in creativity is still viewed as judgement. Naturally, the creative process may 
involve intuitive judgements, for example judging which path to pursue in the course of a 
research progress. However, we argue that there is intuition which is not judgement, which 
actually produces the novum (new knowledge). This is what we call intuitive insight.
Scientists, artists and philosophers as well as those examining scientists, artists and philoso-
phers, report on the intuition of creative individuals. As Hadamard (1954) shows through a number 
of examples, the use of intuition in creativity (in his case in mathematical discoveries) is a rule 
rather than a curiosum. Popper (1968: 8) agrees and further argues that there cannot be a logical 
method of having ideas and that every discovery contains ‘a creative intuition’ in Bergson’s sense. 
The descriptions of intuition in this literature mention all the characteristics of intuition noted 
above or elsewhere in the management literature (e.g. Dane and Pratt, 2007; Kahneman, 2003; 
Sadler-Smith, 2008). If we accept that those characteristics define intuition then what fits the defi-
nition has to be considered intuition.
Here we take a step back to approach the intuitive insight from the perspective of the insight as 
previously we approached it from the perspective of intuition. Several scholars, such as Dane and 
Pratt (2009: 4), Hogarth (2001: 12, 250–254), Sadler-Smith (2008: 30–31, 2009: 91) and Vance 
et al. (2007: 169–170) emphasize that there are a number of seemingly similar concepts in relation 
intuition, one of these being insight. Insight in these cases refers to the process of arriving at the 
solution of well-structured problems (Simon, 1973). Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2007: 189) explicitly 
talk about insight in ‘the context of a well-defined problem’, and they give examples in which 
people explain the way of arriving at a solution: this solution can be objectively checked for being 
correct and so forth. Solving well-structured problems, however, does not require creating new 
knowledge. As in the case of judgement, there may be two kinds of insight: an intuitive and a non-
intuitive one (Figure 3). Non-intuitive insight is at work in the case of well-structured problems, a 
typical one being the Prisoner in the Tower (Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2007: 189), whilst ill-struc-
tured problems call for intuitive insight.
Solutions of ill-structured problems arrived at by intuitive insight always have a degree of sub-
jectivity and, even if the creative person can demonstrate the relationships between the parts of the 
solution, the way of arriving at this solution will remain inexpressible in words or other symbols. 
We provide three typical examples here for illustration. Gauss gives an account of a solution to a 
long-standing problem he obtained through intuitive insight (Hong, 2006a: 144): ‘The riddle 
solved itself as lighting strikes, and I myself could not tell or show the connection between what I 
knew before, what I last used to experiment with, and what produced the final success.’ More gen-
erally about his findings he says (Polanyi, 1962a: 131): ‘I have had my solutions for a long time 
but I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them’. Poincaré’s story is probably the most often 
quoted example of intuitive insight in science (see e.g. Damasio, 1994; Goldberg, 1983b; Hadamard, 
1954; Polanyi and Prosch, 1977; Vaughan, 1979). Poincaré had spent a long time in a futile attempt 
to prove that there cannot be functions with certain characteristics, called Fuchsian functions. 
However, whilst on an excursion he forgot about his work and then, just when he was putting his 
foot on the step, in a flash of intuitive insight he not only realized that such functions can exist, but 
he basically defined the first known class of Fuchsian functions on the spot (Poincaré, 1914: 53): 
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‘I made no verification, and had no time to do so, since I took up the conversation again as soon as 
I had sat down in the break, but I felt absolute certainty at once’. A good example from a field 
outside science is Mozart, who is often quoted trying to explain how for him music does happen in 
time but rather he conceives it as a whole. He also confesses (quoted by Goldberg, 1983a: 178): 
‘Whence and how they come, I know not, nor can I force them’.
Sometimes, however, the creative person cannot even explain the relationships between the 
parts of the solution. This assertion is illustrated through cases when the relationships are eventu-
ally discovered only substantially later – and sometimes by people other than the creator of the 
novum. We illustrate this with two famous examples from the history of science. The first is an 
anecdote told by physicists about Dirac’s equations which are usually considered the second most 
brilliant result of theoretical physics (after Einstein’s theory of general relativity). Someone else 
had to point out to him that his equations actually predicted anti-matter, to which Dirac responded: 
my equations were smarter than I was. The other example is Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution 
by natural selection. He introduced two concepts that signified only one phenomenon, namely 
‘fitness’ and ‘natural selection’. It was only after Dawkins’ (1989) introduction of (selfish) genes 
into the theory of evolution that it became clear that we actually do need two concepts as we need 
to talk about the survival of fittest genes whilst the natural selection operates upon the individual 
members of species.
Thus drawing on literature from outside the field of management, we show that there is a type 
of insight which is obtained in a way that demonstrates the features we expect from intuition. This 
does not contradict the distinction between intuition and insight described by Hogarth (2001), 
Dane and Pratt (2007) and Sadler-Smith (2008) amongst others, as they are distinguishing between 
intuition and ‘non-intuitive’ insights. This is very important as the two are similar in many ways 
and they should not be confused. We, however, are adding a further nuance to this distinction by 
identifying a version of insight which is intuitive, thus also achieving symmetry with judgement 
which also has intuitive and ‘non-intuitive’ versions (see Figure 3).
Intuitive  
Insight
Intuitive  
Judgement
Non Intuitive  
Insight
Non Intuitive  
Judgement
PROBLEM
DECISION
WELL-STRUCTURED
ILL-STRUCTURED
Figure 3. Intuitive and analytical parts of judgement and insight.
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Discussion of the two intuitions
Once we managed to conceptually delineate intuitive judgement from intuitive insight, we found 
some traces of similar ideas in the literature, although these were not elaborated in any substan-
tial detail. Perhaps most importantly, Polanyi (Polanyi and Prosch, 1977: 96 ff.) distinguishes 
‘strategic intuition’, which points to a direction worth pursuing, and ‘concluding intuition’, 
which gets us to a novum, to a (creative) solution of a problem. The first corresponds to intuitive 
judgement and the second corresponds to intuitive insight. Similarly, Bruner (1977: 62) talks 
about intuition in decisions and problem solving. Particularly, he uses the example of mathemati-
cians (Bruner, 1977: 55, 56) to describe intuition in judging whether a solution is correct or an 
approach to problem can be fruitful as distinct from intuition which suddenly reaches a solution. 
In the management field, based on a series of empirical studies Agor (1986: 11–14) identified 
three ways in which executives use intuition: as an explorer, ‘to foresee the correct path to fol-
low’ which corresponds to intuitive judgement; as a ‘synthesizer and integrator’ which comes 
close to intuitive insight; and as what ‘might be termed eclectic’, which is a combination of the 
previous two. These three works mention uses of intuition which come close to what we call 
intuitive judgement and intuitive insight; however, none of them delineates the two and exam-
ines the consequences of this delineation. Duggan (2007) attempts making a similar distinction, 
however, whilst he accumulated significant amount of interesting material, some of which can be 
used in support of our argument, he fails in creating meaningful categories and also chooses 
unfortunate labels. For example, ‘ordinary intuition’ is not clearly specified and sometimes it 
appears to be some sort of miscellaneous category. The distinction between ‘expert intuition’ 
 and ‘strategic intuition’ resembles the previously mentioned expert vs. entrepreneurial intuition 
distinction. While some of Duggan’s explanations suggest that he might have thought of some-
thing similar to our distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight, his choice of 
category labels is very misleading. When we think of strategy, we normally relate it primarily to 
decisions and Polanyi (Polanyi and Prosch, 1977) used the same term with a meaning close to 
intuitive judgement. Therefore, while we think that there is significant amount of interesting 
discussions offered by Duggan, we do not think that his categories are viable as they stand.
As we have mentioned earlier, we see the distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive 
insight as an additional dimension to existing typologies. For instance, in the case of moral intui-
tion, we can have an intuitive moral judgement, for example classifying an action as good or evil, 
and we can also create a new moral value through intuitive moral insight, for example that all men 
are born equal (see examples in Figure 4).
In decision making4 as well as in creativity we also may find both intuitive judgement and 
intuitive insight. This is the very reason that it is so problematic to recognize intuitive judgement 
and intuitive insight as two separate types of intuition; they can rarely be attained in a pure form 
(see Figure 3). An intuitive decision process may not only involve intuitive judgements but also 
intuitive insights. For instance, generating decision alternatives may involve creativity and thus 
intuitive insight. Conversely, a creative process may involve, apart from intuitive insights, 
instances of intuitive judgement, for example when choosing in which direction to continue the 
research. However, the dominant role in decision taking is played by intuitive judgement and the 
dominant role in creativity is played by intuitive insight. Therefore we cannot conceptualize 
creativity involving intuition without coming to terms about delineating intuitive judgement 
from intuitive insight.
In this section, we have argued that there are certain differences between intuitive judgement 
and intuitive insight; however the six characteristics of intuition outlined in the introduction apply 
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to both of them. Similarly, the structure of intuiting as an integrative process applies both of them. 
In the case of intuitive judgement, the decision aspects are tacitly integrated into a picture about 
what to do. In the case of intuitive insight, the components of the domain knowledge are tacitly 
integrated in a novel way producing knowledge that did not exist before.
Conclusions
Based on two earlier research projects (and exploration of the literature), we distinguish between 
intuitive judgement and intuitive insight. This way of conceptualizing types of intuition takes an 
alternative perspective from the typologies available in the literature; and we believe helps illu-
minate the role of intuition in creativity, which is less well conceptualized in the management 
literature than intuitive judgement.
The main limitation of the present inquiry stems from the initial assumptions, namely that we 
have only examined intuitive knowledge and not the other three levels of intuitive awareness (i.e. 
physical, emotional and spiritual). Therefore the results only apply to intuitive knowledge. 
Additional research will be needed to understand the relationship between intuitive judgement and 
insight in the other three intuitive faculties. There may also be synergies between all four to be 
explored. Another potential limitation is the observation made earlier that there are many ways of 
distinguishing between kinds of intuition, several of which were mentioned. We chose to distin-
guish two kinds of intuition based on the areas in which intuition is used and have come up with a 
conceptual process to delineate between intuitive judgement and intuitive insight and also how to 
delineate these forms of intuition from their non-intuitive counterparts. Other ways of identifying 
kinds of intuition may lead to different results and the relation of the present typology to other 
typologies could be of further interest. Finally, this article is predominantly based on a critical 
review of literature and conceptual modelling building upon theoretical and empirical works of 
others. Therefore it lacks empirical support in the sense of purposeful observations or experiments; 
these remain open topics for further research.
Apart from the future research directions directly arising from the limitations of the current 
research, there are also several obvious areas for exploring the relationships of the two types of 
intuition proposed here to other constructs in the area of intuition. Three particularly promising 
paths from the previously discussed literature are Sonenshein’s (2007) sensemaking-intuition 
model, the various models of knowledge levels and the two process-oriented articles (Glöckner 
and Witteman, 2009; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011).
Our idea of future use of the model is twofold: first, we would like to provide a useful starting 
point for management researchers pursuing their inquiries into (or through) the area of intuition; 
second, we would like to provide a comprehensive tool for the educators of current and future 
Intuitive judgement Intuitive insight
Problem solving 
intuition
Deciding about an 
alternative or about a 
direction
Creating solution which
entails new knowledge
Moral intuition Judging whether an action 
is good or evil
Creating a new moral value
Aesthetic intuition
Judging something as 
beautiful or ugly
Creating something beautiful
Figure 4. Two-dimensional typology of intuition.
 by Viktor Dörfler on October 13, 2016mlq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
560 Management Learning 43(5)
knowledge workers for explaining intuition. Additionally, we believe that better understanding 
of the role of intuition in creativity can be beneficial for knowledge-oriented organizations. With 
regards to our own future research, the present model is part of a larger project involving a series 
of models and aiming at a dynamic model(s) of knowledge and then at a dynamic model of 
cognition.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like thank the reviewers for their helpful and insightful comments in making this article a 
stronger contribution.
Notes
1. There are various terms used as a contrast to ‘intuitive’, perhaps the most frequent being ‘analytical’. 
Analysis does have some features that can be contrasted to intuition, most significantly that it is normally 
carried out step-by-step. However, the essence of analysis is dissecting things into smaller pieces, thus the 
opposite of analysis is actually synthesis rather than intuition. Furthermore, intuition can work in form of 
both analysis and synthesis. So the reason for using the term ‘non-intuitive’ is trying to avoid the vague 
use of terms as it may lead to contradiction and misunderstanding, as we will show later in the article.
2. The term ‘decision taking’ is used explicitly as a distinction from ‘decision making’ where the former 
refers to deciding about a course of action whilst the latter is a more comprehensive concept which 
includes other phases apart from decision taking, such as collecting information (intelligence) and gener-
ating alternatives (cf. Mintzberg et al., 1976; Simon, 1977).
3. Polanyi’s original example talks about exploring a cavern using a probe.
4. This time referring to the more comprehensive process which includes decision taking.
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